FSS-DGPA seminar: "The Unintended Effects of the “17+1” Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern Europe)" by Prof. Emilian KAVALSKI, 23rd October 2019 (Wednesday), 15:00-16:15, E21-G002
社會科學學院政府與行政學系講座
Ref. No : VVOG-BH3ATTPosted by :VivianVong/UMAC
Department :FSSPosted Date : 18/10/2019
Category :
Lecture/Seminar
講座


Department of Government and Public Administration, FSS
Jean Monnet Chair Speakers Series “Macao Talk on European Politics”
The Unintended Effects of the “17+1” Cooperation between
China and Central and Eastern Europe
Speaker:
Prof. Emilian KAVALSKI
Li Dak Sum Chair Professor
University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China

Date:23rd October 2019 (Wednesday)
Time:15:00-16:15
Venue:E21-G002, Humanities and Social Sciences Building
Language:English
Speaker:
Prof. Emilian KAVALSKI is the Li Dak Sum Chair Professor in China-Eurasia Relations and International Studies and the Director of the Global Institute for Silk Roads Studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo, China. His work explore the interconnections between the simultaneous decentering of International Relations by post-Western perspectives and non-anthropocentric approaches. Emilian is the author of four books, most recently: The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (Routledge 2018) and he is the editor of eleven volumes, including World Politics at the Edge of Chaos (State University of New York Press, 2018).

Abstract:
The Central and East European (CEE) part of the Eurasian landmass is often overlooked in the conversations on contemporary geopolitics. Yet, owing to China’s investments in the CEE countries, the region has been subject to growing strategic attention. This paper offers a brief overview of the history of this relationship by focusing on the “17+1” mechanism. Nestled within the broader Belt and Road Initiative, the “17+1”has provided a unique regional arrangement for extending Chinese influence in the sixteen CEE countries. The presentation will suggest some of the unintended effects of such relationship by exploring whether there is something else than the instrumental economic reasoning for the willingness of CEE countries to partner with China. The analysis detects four distinct (and mutually exclusive) strategic narratives motivating the participation of CEE states in the “17+1” mechanism. The study will also indicate some of the hurdles posed by such identity geopolitics not only in the CEE region, but throughout the vast expanse covered by the BRI initiative.




ALL ARE WELCOME